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* Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law.
1. Mercer-Fraser v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 40 Cal. 2d 102 (1953) (hereinafter “Mercer-
Fraser”).
2. Hawaiian Pineapple Co. Ltd. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 40 Cal. 2d 656 (1953) (here-
inafter “Hawaiian Pineapple”).
3. Cal. Lab. Code §4553 provides that:
The amount of compensation otherwise recoverable shall be increased one-half, to-
gether with costs and expenses not to exceed two hundred fifty dollars ($250),
where the employee is injured by reason of the serious and willful misconduct of
any of the following: (a) The employer, or his managing representative; (b) If the
employer is a partnership, on the part of one of the partners or a managing rep-
resentative or general superintendent thereof; (c) If the employer is a corporation,
on the part of an executive, managing officer, or general superintendent thereof.
Justice Jesse Carter’s
Passionate Defense of
Workers’ Rights:
Challenging the Majority’s
“Legal Legerdemain”
By Marci Seville*
Introduction
In two 1953 decisions, Mercer-Fraser Company v. Industrial Accident Com-
mission1 and Hawaiian Pineapple Company Ltd v. Industrial Accident Commis-
sion,2 the California Supreme Court considered the proper interpretation of
Labor Code section 4553, a provision in the workers’ compensation system
that allows for an additional monetary award when an employee is injured be-
cause of an employer’s “serious and willful misconduct.”3 The Court gave a re-
strictive reading to the Labor Code and annulled decisions of the California
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4. The Industrial Accident Commission was the administrative agency responsible for
adjudicating worker claims under the state workers’ compensation system. The agency is
now the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board.
5. InMercer-Fraser, Justice Carter asked “[b]y what legerdemain may it be said that an
employer who is found guilty of serious and wilful misconduct because he knowingly and
wilfully failed to provide a safe place for his employees to work, is guilty of negligence only?”
(See Mercer-Fraser, 40 Cal. 2d at131). Taken from the French expression leger de main or light
of hand, legerdemain means a sleight of hand or a cleverly executed trick or deception. Jus-
tice Carter’s fondness for characterizing the majority’s analysis as legerdemain can also be
found in: Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McConnell, 44 Cal. 2d 715, 734 (1955) (“The major-
ity opinion is a masterpiece of legal legerdemain.”); Henderson v. Drake, 42 Cal. 2d 1, 8
(1953) (“By a skillful process of legal legerdemain the majority opinion attempts to bring
to life an attachment which died a natural death . . . when plaintiff ’s motion for a new trial
was granted by the trial court.”); Simpson v. L.A., 40 Cal. 2d 271, 283 (1953) (“The major-
ity of this court indulges in some legerdemain in the field of judicial legislation . . .”); Pri-
donoff v. Balokovich, 36 Cal. 2d 788, 794 (1951) (“By what legerdemain is an author
immunized from general and exemplary damages when his libelous article is published in
a newspaper, but is not so immunized when such article is published in a magazine, pam-
phlet or other form of publication?”); American Distilling Co. v. City Council of Sausalito,
34 Cal. 2d 660, 668 (1950) (“By what legerdemain is such a conclusion reached?”).
6. See Hawaiian Pineapple, 40 Cal. 2d at 668 (Carter, J., dissenting).
7. See Mercer-Fraser, 40 Cal. 2d at 132 (Carter, J., dissenting).
8. See Hawaiian Pineapple, 40 Cal. 2d at 668 (Carter, J., dissenting).
Industrial Accident Commission that had found serious and willful misconduct
by the respective employers.4 In doing so, the Court departed from its earlier
and more expansive view of serious and willful misconduct. InMercer-Fraser,
as in a number of other dissents, Justice Carter accused his fellow justices of
reasoning that amounted to legal “legerdemain.”5
Justice Carter’s passionate dissents inMercer-Fraser and Hawaiian Pineap-
ple charged the majority with “blotting out four decades of progress in the field
of social legislation for the benefit of the working men and women of this
state,”6 reverting to “the age-old reactionary concept of property rights above
human welfare,”7 and engaging in “not only a travesty on social justice but an
insidious abuse of judicial power.”8
Although the California Supreme Court has yet to overturn the stringent
test for serious and willful misconduct developed in these 1953 decisions, sub-
sequent opinions of the Supreme Court and the lower appellate courts have
artfully distinguishedMercer-Frasier and Hawaiian Pineapple, in order to up-
hold increased awards to injured workers in certain circumstances. While the
Court has not adopted Justice Carter’s liberal interpretation of Labor Code
section 4553, his eloquent dissents inMercer-Fraser andHawaiian Pineapple stand
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9. Id.
10. Arthur B. Honnold, Theory of Workmen’s Compensation (1917–1918) 3 Cornell
L.Q. 264.
11. Id. at 265.
12. Workmen’s Compensation, Insurance and Safety Act (Stats. 1913, ch. 176, §1)
(commonly known as the Boynton Act).
13. Prior to passage of the 1913 act, California, like many states, had a workers com-
pensation law providing for employer’s voluntary participation, the Compensation Act of
1911 (Stats. 1911, ch. 399) (commonly known as the Roseberry Act). For further discus-
sion of the history of the workers compensation movement in the United States, see, Fried-
man & Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents 67Colum. L. Rev. 50 (1967).
14. Honnold, supra, 3 Cornell L. Q. at 267–68.
as a moving tribute to the sacrifices of the working men and women of Cali-
fornia.
TheWorkers Compensation System
as Social Legislation
The “progress in social legislation,” to which Justice Carter referred inHawai-
ian Pineapple,9 was the development of the state’s workers’ compensation sys-
tem. As one scholar commented nearly 100 years ago, “[w]ith the advance in
industrial life, and the increased use of machinery, increasing the hazard to
life and limb, the number of injuries to workmen multiplied. . . . Breakage of
the human machine was just as certain to occur as breakage of the machinery
used in carrying on industries.”10 Workers Compensation laws were enacted
to address the fact that “[s]ome employers came to the conclusion ... that it would
be cheaper to run the risk of being held liable for accidents than to install im-
proved machine and proper safe-guards.”11 In 1913, the California legislature
enacted the Workmen’s Compensation, Insurance and Safety Act,12 Califor-
nia’s first program mandating that employers provide benefits for employees
who suffer work related illnesses or injuries.13
The philosophy underlying workers’ compensation legislation is:
the economic principle of trade risk in that personal injury losses in-
cident to industrial pursuits are, like wages and breakage of machine,
a part of the cost of production. These laws are human remedial en-
actments intended to give vitality to the idea that personal injury losses
incident to an employee’s services are as much a part of the labor cost
of such services as wages paid. . . .14
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15. Gunnell v. Metrocolor Labs, 92 Cal. App. 4th 710, 720 (2001) (citing Shoemaker v.
Myers 52 Cal.3d 1, 16 (1990)).
16. In Fermino v. FEDCO, 7 Cal. 4th 701, 713–14 (1994), a case involving false im-
prisonment by an employer, the Supreme Court described a “tripartite system for classify-
ing injuries arising in the course of employment.” There are (1) injuries caused by employer
negligence or without employer fault that are compensated at the normal rate under the
workers’ compensation system; (2) injuries caused by employer conduct that intentionally
harms an employee, for which the employee may be entitled to extra compensation under
Labor Code §4553; and (3) certain limited types of intentional employer conduct which
bring the employer beyond the boundaries of the compensation bargain, for which a civil
action may be brought.
17. See Mercer-Fraser, 40 Cal. 2d at 131.
18. Id.
A central premise of the workers’ compensation system is a trade-off known
as the “compensation bargain.” The courts have described this bargain as one
in which the employer:
assumes liability for industrial personal injury or death without re-
gard to fault in exchange for limitations on the amount of that liabil-
ity. . . . The employee, without having to prove fault, receives relatively
swift and certain benefits to cure or relieve the effects of industrial in-
jury. In exchange, the employee gives up the wider range of civil tort
damages potentially available.15
To balance the employer concessions, the various legislatures immunized
the employer against common law suit. Thus, while employees with occupa-
tional injuries or illnesses generally cannot sue their employers in a civil court
action because of this “compensation bargain,” Labor Code section 4553 pro-
vides for extra compensation within the workers compensation system—a 50%
increase in compensation otherwise recoverable—in cases of serious and will-
ful employer misconduct.16
In discussing the additional compensation for serious and willful miscon-
duct, Justice Carter noted “the basic concept that industry should bear the bur-
den of injuries suffered by working men and women in the course of their
employment.”17 Because the employer “could insure against injuries resulting
from negligence it was necessary, in order to force employers to comply with
safety regulations and provide safe places of employment, that they be sub-
jected to increased awards to those injured as the result of their willful failure
to so comply.” (Emphasis added).18 In Justice Carter’s view, the majority’s rea-
soning inMercer-Fraser was “out of harmony with the social philosophy which
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19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Hawaiian Pineapple, 40 Cal. 2d at 662.
postulated the statutory provisions here involved and renders them ineffec-
tive.”19
The Majority Opinions in
Mercer-Fraser andHawaiian Pineapple and
Justice Carter’s Response
In Mercer-Fraser, the majority annulled a determination of the Industrial
Accident Commission (the “commission”) finding serious and willful mis-
conduct by the employer after two workers were killed and two others were
seriously injured when a building collapsed. The cause of the collapse was in-
sufficient bracing, a condition known to the employer’s superintendent and
which the employer had the means and opportunity to correct. The Court
held that the superintendent was not guilty of more than negligence, and that
“serious and willful misconduct is basically the antithesis of negligence and . . .
the two types of behavior are mutually exclusive.”20 It explained that negligent
conduct is “devoid of either an intention to do harm or of knowledge or ap-
preciation of the fact that danger is likely to result therefrom,” while willful
misconduct is an act “deliberately done for the express purpose of injuring an-
other, or intentionally performed either with knowledge that serious injury is
a probable result or with a positive, active, wanton, reckless and absolute dis-
regard of its possibly damaging consequences.”21
In Hawaiian Pineapple, the majority annulled a commission finding of se-
rious and willful misconduct, where an employer knew about and had failed
to take measures to address a dangerous railroad crossing used regularly by
the company’s forklift drivers. Citing its opinion three months earlier inMer-
cer-Fraser, the Court noted that “ ‘serious and willful misconduct’ denotes a
greater degree of culpability than mere negligent or even grossly negligent con-
duct.”22 The majority explained that:
the conduct must be with knowledge of the peril to be apprehended,
or done with a positive and active disregard of the consequences. A“reck-
less disregard” of the safety of employees is not sufficient in itself un-
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23. Id. at 663.
24. See Mercer-Fraser, 40 Cal. 2d at 119.
25. Id.; Hawaiian Pineapple, 40 Cal. 2d at 665.
26. See Hawaiian Pineapple, 40 Cal. 2d at 665.
27. See Mercer-Fraser, 40 Cal. 2d at 132, citing Labor Code §3202 which provides that
“[t]his division and Division 5 (commencing with §6300) shall be liberally construed by the
courts with the purpose of extending their benefits for the protection of persons injured in
the course of their employment.”
28. Id.
29. See Hawaiian Pineapple, 40 Cal. 2d at 668.
less the evidence shows that the disregard was more culpable than a
careless or even a grossly careless omission or act. It must be an affir-
mative and knowing disregard of the consequences. Likewise, a find-
ing that the “employer knew or should have known had he put his
mind to it” does not constitute a finding that the employer had that
degree of knowledge of the consequences of his act that would make
his conduct wilful. The standard requires an act or omission to which
the employer has “put his mind.”23
InMercer-Fraser andHawaiian Pineapple, the high court distinguished, but
did not overrule, several of its earlier cases holding, among other things, that
“an employer’s mistake in judgment does not relieve him from liability for se-
rious and willful misconduct.”24 The majority concluded that such decisions had
no application, because they involved the violation of an express statute or
commission safety order, which was not the case inMercer-Fraser andHawai-
ian Pineapple.25
In addition to Justice Carter’s conclusion that the Court had rolled back
forty years of social progress, he was of the opinion that the Court had un-
dercut the will of the legislature and abused its power by refusing to give a lib-
eral construction to section 4553. Carter wrote that the Court had struck a
“lethal blow” such that section 4553 was “nullified and stricken from the statute
book by judicial interpretation.”26 Noting that the legislature had “declared it
to be the duty of the courts to liberally construe the provisions of the workers
compensation laws ‘with the purpose of extending their benefits for the pro-
tection of persons injured in the course of their employment,’ ”27 he concluded
that theMercer-Frasier decision “. . . finds no parallel in the annals of the judi-
cial history of this state in its antithesis of liberal construction. . . .”28 He con-
cluded in Hawaiian Pineapple that it was the “. . . old story of the will of the
people and the Legislature being defeated by reactionary court decisions.”29
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30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Lambreton v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 46 Cal. 2d 498, 503 (1956); Johns-
Manville Sales Corp. v.Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Horenberger), 96 Cal. App. 3d 923, 932
(1979); White v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., 265 Cal. App. 2d 115, 120 (1968); Shell Oil
Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 12 Cal. App. 4th 715, 741 (1993) (applying the Mercer-
Fraser analysis to the interpretation of California Insurance Code §533).
34. See, e.g., 2 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2006) Workers Compensation,
§319, Contemporary Approach (“A return to the liberal view . . . took place in Keeley v. In-
dustrial Acc. Comm’n, 55 Cal. 2d 261 (1961).”); see also, 1–11 Herlick, Cal. Workers’ Com-
pensation Law, (2006) Actionable Employer Misconduct §11.14 [2] (“Appellate decisions
indicate two trends in recent years affecting the definition of serious and willful misconduct,”
discussing cases with a somewhat broader interpretation of §4553, including Keeley v. Indus.
Accident Comm’n, supra, Dowden v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 223 Cal. App. 2d 124 (1963),
Grason Elec. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 238 Cal. App. 2d 46 (1965), and Rogers Mate-
rials Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 63 Cal. 2d 717 (1965)).
35. See, e.g., Keeley v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 55 Cal. 2d at 267, noting that Mercer-
Fraser & Hawaiian Pineapple cases “dealt with an entirely different problem than the one
Finally, Justice Carter pointedly expressed his view that the majority was
more concerned with saving the employer money than with the life and limb
of the state’s workers. He emphasized in his Hawaiian Pineapple dissent that
“. . . the only reason this hazardous condition was permitted to exist was solely
because the maintenance of an adequate safety measure would cost the em-
ployer money.”30 By its enactment of Labor Code section 4553, the legislature
“sought to correct this evil, but the majority of this court, solicitous only of the
financial welfare of the employer, says no, it is too great a burden for the em-
ployer to bear.”31 He concluded that “. . . we are back where we were 40 years
ago so far as the enforcement of safety regulations is concerned.”32
Conclusion
Mercer-Fraser andHawaiian Pineapple raised the bar significantly for work-
ers seeking additional compensation under Labor Code section 4553, and the
opinions are often cited for the principle that willful misconduct is the “an-
tithesis of negligence.”33 While some commentators have recognized a “con-
temporary approach”with a return, in some situations, to a more liberal analysis
of serious and willful misconduct claims,34 workers still face substantial chal-
lenges when seeking additional monetary awards for serious and willful mis-
conduct. When the circumstances are sufficiently egregious, the courts may
distinguish Mercer-Fraser and Hawaiian Pineapple.35 However, Justice Carter
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here involved . . . Neither case involved, held or implied that an employer who intention-
ally places an employee in a position of known and obvious danger without taking any
precautions for his safety could not be guilty of willful misconduct by reason of that fact
alone.”
36. See Hawaiian Pineapple, 40 Cal. 2d at 668.
would, no doubt, stand firm in his view that the Supreme Court engaged in
“legal legerdemain” in its 1953 rulings and would find unacceptable the cau-
tious and very limited movement away from the stringent Mercer-Fraser and
Hawaiian Pineapple interpretations of Labor Code section 4553. These deci-
sions were, after all, “not only a travesty on social justice but an insidious abuse
of judicial power.”36
DISSENT (Mercer-Fraser)
Carter, J. I dissent.
The majority opinion in this case . . . annuls the award [of the Industrial Ac-
cident Commission] because it interprets [the commission’s] findings as sup-
porting a conclusion that petitioner was guilty of negligence only. By what
legerdemain may it be said that an employer who is found guilty of serious
and wilful misconduct because he knowingly and wilfully failed to provide a
safe place for his employees to work, is guilty of negligence only? The answer
to this question contained in the majority opinion is based upon a process of
reasoning out of harmony with the social philosophy which postulated the
statutory provisions here involved and renders them ineffective. This philos-
ophy stems from the basic concept that industry should bear the burden of in-
juries suffered by working men and women in the course of their employment,
and since the employer could insure against injuries resulting from negligence
it was necessary, in order to force employers to comply with safety regulations
and provide safe places of employment, that they be subjected to increased
awards to those injured as the result of their wilful failure to so comply. This
philosophy is embodied in our statutes, and cases arising thereunder which
have come to this court for review indicate judicious consideration by the In-
dustrial Accident Commission. The case at bar is no exception.
Brushing aside the sophistry with which the majority opinion is replete, what
are the realities of the situation here presented? . . . A building collapsed in the
course of construction and four men working thereon were seriously injured—
two of them fatally. It is admitted that the cause of the collapse was insufficient
bracing—that this condition was called to the attention of the employer’s su-
perintendent and he did nothing to correct it although he had ample time and
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the means to do so. In other words the building was unsafe because it was not
sufficiently braced and the employer knew that it was therefore highly danger-
ous—a danger that would inevitably result in serious injuries and death. Yet
with that knowledge he put the workmen on the job. Certainly if an employer
knows a place of work is fraught with grave danger but still compels his em-
ployees to face that danger, he evinces a reckless disregard of the safety of his em-
ployees. Whatever may have been the motives for his conduct, to save money,
or time or to satisfy a sadistic impulse is not important. The weak excuse of the
superintendent that he thought the building had enough bracing cannot change
the result. . . . [T]he commission found that the employer knowingly and wil-
fully failed to provide a safe place of employment for the men who were injured
and that such failure constituted serious and wilful misconduct. I do not see
how the commission could have found otherwise. But the majority of the court
seems to be more concerned with technical terms and phraseology than the lib-
eral application of the law enacted for the protection of workingmen and women
who have suffered loss of life and serious injuries as the result of its violation.
In fact, the whole tenor of the majority opinion is to emphasize the burden
placed on the employer by this legislation and minimize its salutary objective.
It is the age-old reactionary concept of property rights above human welfare:
What does it matter that workingmen and women are killed and injured because
industrial enterprises are unsafe so long as employers can escape liability? To
guard against injury to employees may cost the employer money, so why should
he do so without compulsion? The answer is that experience has shown that
some employers will not provide safety devices unless forced to do so, hence the
remedial legislation here involved—that life and limb of employees be protected
against unnecessary risks even if it costs the employer money to do so. Not only
has the Legislature spoken by creating the liability of increased awards where
serious and wilful misconduct is involved, but it has declared it to be the duty
of the courts to liberally construe the provisions of the act “with the purpose of
extending their benefits for the protection of persons injured in the course of their
employment.” (Emphasis added.) (Lab. Code, §3202.) This legislation has been
generally accepted as extending to working men and women a measure of the
economic and social justice to which people in industrial employment are en-
titled. Thinking people agree that social progress means, generally speaking, the
gradual advancement of human welfare toward greater physical, moral and cul-
tural enjoyment of life. The legislation here involved tends toward this objective
and should be liberally construed to achieve it. The present decision finds no par-
allel in the annals of the judicial history of this state in its antithesis of liberal con-
struction with respect to both the act here involved and the proceedings before
the Industrial Accident Commission and this court. . . .
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... [T]he commission expressly found the existence of wilful misconduct in de-
tail. . . . [I]t is said that the misconduct occurred particularly as follows: That at
and prior to the time of the collapse the employer “did knowingly and wilfully fail”;
then follow seven separate paragraphs (a to g) specifying what the employerwil-
fully and knowingly failed to do or did, such as to furnish a safe place for the em-
ployee to work, to furnish and use proper safety devices, namely, bracing and guying
for the structure so as to prevent its collapse. That such findings are adequate is
beyond doubt. If an employer knowingly and wilfully fails to furnish a safe place
for the employee to work (a safe place of employment is required by the safety
laws of this state) or to furnish supports to prevent a certain building from col-
lapsing and injuring and killing workmen, we have the clearest case of serious
and wilful misconduct that could be imagined (footnote omitted).
The majority opinion cannot be reconciled with numerous cases. . . . The
cases are quite uniform to the effect that permitting employees to work under
dangerous conditions which are capable of being guarded against, constitutes
such a reckless disregard for the safety of the employees that the Commission’s
finding that such conduct is serious and wilful will not be disturbed. The mere
fact the employer did not believe the condition was dangerous does not relieve
him from liability. Thus in Blue Diamond Plaster Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 188
Cal. 403, 409, the employee was killed as a result of the failure of the employer
to place guards on machinery. The managing agents of the employer testified
that they knew of the condition, but stated that they did not consider the con-
dition unsafe. ‘Their mistake in judgment upon that subject cannot be held to
relieve their employer from liability.’ An award based on serious and wilful mis-
conduct was affirmed. In Hoffman v. Department of Industrial Relations, 209
Cal. 383, it was held that where the employer violated the terms of a statute pro-
viding for a specified type of temporary flooring and its method of construc-
tion to be used when erecting a building, he was guilty of serious and wilful
misconduct, even though the employer was ignorant of the provisions of the
statute. In Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 209 Cal. 412, the em-
ployee was injured by an unguarded saw. The employer was held guilty of se-
rious and wilful misconduct although the saw had been in operation but a
week, and the employer testified that he intended to place a guard thereon. In
Gordon v. Industrial Acc. Com., 199 Cal. 420, the employee was killed in a cave-
in of a gravel pit. It was held that compelling an employee to work in a dan-
gerous spot, without taking protective measures, where the employer knows
or should have known of the danger is serious and wilful misconduct. In hold-
ing an employer guilty of serious and wilful misconduct under somewhat sim-
ilar circumstances the appellate court in Johannsen v. Industrial Acc. Com., 113
Cal.App. 162, stated: ‘Had he (the employer) turned his mind to a considera-
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tion of the subject he must have known that a person working in the trench was
in jeopardy, which danger could readily have been obviated by the necessary
bracing.’ ”
While the above cited cases differ factually from the case at bar the philos-
ophy and legal concept of those cases is equally applicable here. The danger-
ous character of the place where the employees were required to work was
obvious. If it was not known it was of such a character that it should have been
known. Steps could easily have been taken to alleviate the danger but the em-
ployer did nothing whatsoever and sent the employees on that dangerous mis-
sion with reckless disregard of their safety. . . . The safety statute here requires
that the structure be safe, that is, secured against collapsing by sufficient guy
wires or bracing. This the employer knew but wilfully disregarded. Such dis-
regard constituted serious and wilful misconduct.
I would therefore affirm the awards here made.
DISSENT (Hawaiian Pineapple)
Carter, J. I dissent.
By its decision here the majority has completed the reactionary process, com-
menced by its decision inCalifornia Shipbuilding Corp. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 31
Cal. 2d 278, and carried forward by its decisions in Mercer-Fraser Co. v. Indus-
trial Acc. Com., ante, p. 102 and Sutter Butte Canal Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com.,
ante, p. 139 of judicial repeal of the workmen’s compensation law that an award
shall be increased for wilful misconduct of the employer. (Lab. Code, §4553.) I
reiterate what I said in my dissents in those cases. The lethal blow has now been
struck and section 4553 of the Labor Code has been nullified and stricken from
the statute book by judicial interpretation. By these decisions this court has blot-
ted out four decades of progress in the field of social legislation for the benefit of
the working men and women of this state, and overruled numerous decisions of
this court and the District Court of Appeal without even mentioning them.
The majority opinion holds that neither the findings nor the evidence es-
tablishes serious and wilful misconduct.
With reference to the findings, they are clearly sufficient under the author-
ities cited in my dissent inMercer-Fraser Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, ante,
p. 129. They expressly state that the general superintendent of the employer knew
that his failure to provide safety devices was likely to result in serious injury.
While it is also found that he should have had that knowledge, that in no way
detracts from the finding of actual knowledge.
Briefly, the facts are that the employer maintained an extremely dangerous
condition of its property, that is, a railway crossing which must be crossed by
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its employees, and had taken no steps to protect the employees against that
peril. I say it took no steps because the evidence shows that the steps it did
take were so completely ineffectual as to be no protection whatsoever. More-
over, one of the steps taken, the presence of the signal light to warn of an ap-
proaching train, went beyond being ineffectual; it operated as a pitfall and trap
for the employees inasmuch as it was operated sometimes and not others. All
these conditions the employer knew of, yet it did nothing to correct them.
A witness, Amaro, testified that three days before the applicant employee was
injured, he was engaged in the same work, and while driving a lift truck across
the railroad tracks, barely escaped being struck by a train. He told Spiegel, the
employer’s representative in charge, of his near injury and that the signal light
should be fixed so as to turn on automatically when a train was approaching be-
cause“you couldn’t see the train when you came out of the door” to cross the tracks,
that is, in effect, that none of the employer’s devices served to safeguard against
the peril; that a watchman or flagman should be put on the crossing. A mirror
was placed by the employer at the door the same day of Amaro’s near injury pur-
portedly to give an operator of the lift truck a view of approaching trains but it
only gave a view 20 feet down the tracks. He saw the employer’s superintendent
at the crossing after the signal lights were installed and it may be inferred that the
latter knew that they operated only sporadically when someone happened to op-
erate them. It was not customary for the truck drivers to stop at the crossing be-
cause their work load was heavy. This was also known to the superintendent.
A representative of the employer testified he knew there was a train oper-
ating on the crossing at the time of the accident and that no one was operat-
ing the stop lights.
Summarizing, the evidence shows that there was here a very dangerous rail-
road crossing that must be continually traversed by the employees. Its danger
was apparent to anyone from a view of the physical facts. The employer knew
of that danger prior to the accident because it had placed lights to signal the
approach of a train and had a man to operate them during the busier times and
because its superintendent was specifically advised by an employee, who had
a “close call,” of the danger and that none of the devices gave effective protec-
tion. In the face of that knowledge the employer failed to do anything about
it—permitted its employees to bear the risk of this very real hazard. Certainly
it is wholly reasonable to draw an inference that its conduct was in reckless
disregard of its employees’ welfare. Indeed, its conduct amounts to intention-
ally subjecting its employees to injury, and this condition was permitted to
exist solely because protection would cost the employer money. In the face of
the foregoing facts which the record discloses without contradiction, the ma-
jority opinion states: “The evidence and the findings of the commission do
08 oppenheimer final 4/20/10 8:38 AM Page 108
IN DEFENSE OF WORKERS’ RIGHTS 109
not show that the employer had the knowledge of the consequences of its act
or omission necessary to make the performance of that act or omission a wil-
ful one. . . . Looking at the record it is devoid of any substantial evidence that
the employer intended to do harm, or that it had actual knowledge of the prob-
able consequences of its failure to provide more adequate safety devices or a safer
place to work or that it exercised an affirmative and knowing disregard for the
safety of the injured employee.” I cannot reconcile the foregoing statements
with an honest analysis of the record in this case. It is undisputed that during
the so-called busy season, the employer maintained a watchman at the cross-
ing to guard against such accidents as the one here involved. The employer,
therefore, knew that the crossing was a dangerous one and that safety meas-
ures must be taken to guard against accidents of this character. The only sat-
isfactory safety measure which had been employed was the maintenance of a
watchman or an employee to manually operate the blinker lights. This safety
measure was abandoned by the employer during the nonbusy season although
the risk was just as great to the employee during the nonbusy season as dur-
ing the busy season. In the face of this factual background may it be said with
the slightest regard for the truth, that “The evidence and the findings of the com-
mission do not show that the employer had the knowledge of the consequences
of its act or omission necessary to make the performance of that act or omis-
sion a wilful one,” or that “the record is devoid of any substantial evidence that
the employer . . . had actual knowledge of the probable consequences of its fail-
ure to provide more adequate safety devices or a safer place to work or that it
exercised an affirmative and knowing disregard for the safety of the injured
employee.”
I am constrained to repeat a statement hereinabove made, that the only rea-
son this hazardous condition was permitted to exist was solely because the
maintenance of an adequate safety measure would cost the employer money.
The Legislature by its enactment of section 4553 of the Labor Code sought to
correct this evil, but the majority of this court, solicitous only of the financial
welfare of the employer, says no, it is too great a burden for the employer to
bear. So we are back where we were 40 years ago so far as the enforcement of
safety regulations is concerned.
It is the old story of the will of the people and the Legislature being defeated
by reactionary court decisions. To protect employees against unnecessary risks,
the Legislature enacts a law providing that an employer must provide a safe
place for his employees to perform their work, and that failure to do so con-
stitutes wilful misconduct on the part of the employer entitling an employee
injured thereby to an increased award of compensation. Obviously such a law
tends to create increased vigilance on the part of employers to provide safety
08 oppenheimer final 4/20/10 8:38 AM Page 109
110 IN DEFENSE OF WORKERS’ RIGHTS
devices and thus reduce the number of industrial injuries. There can be no
doubt that the present law has had a salutary effect. Its nullification by this
court is not only a travesty on social justice but an insidious abuse of judicial
power.
I would affirm the award here made.
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